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Abstract
Understanding the origins, conditions, advantages and limitations of cooper-
ation in natural and social systems has motivated many investigations in the
biological and social sciences. To investigate individual cooperative behaviour
in the face of temporal and spatial heterogeneity of resources we considered a
definition of cooperation at the same ontological level as competition. We define
a cooperative behaviour when an agent acts upon one or more resource(s) with
a beneficial result in at least one resource for a recipient of this action, and with
a selection process for this behaviour on the side of the acting agent.
We implemented an agent-based model that represents the interactions of
agents through their use of resources. With this model, we illustrated how
scarcity of resources in space and time might create situations where cooperative
behaviour is beneficial to individuals or to egalitarian groups.
Simulations highlighted that temporal scarcity as spatial scarcity of the re-
source procures advantages to egalitarian groups over competitive individuals.
Additionally, the factors favouring equity among agents for the access to the
resource promote the success of cooperation. Simulations also showed the limi-
tations imposed by group size on cooperation in the context of a common-pool
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management system.
The possibility of using indicators of (spatio-temporal) resource variability
to characterize the potential for the emergence of cooperation is an interesting
research objective for future work.
Keywords: Agent-based model, Spatial heterogeneity, Temporal heterogeneity,
Resources, Cooperation, Competition.
1. Introduction
Competition has been a leitmotif process of selection in evolutionary the-
ories of Darwinism since 1859 and in neo-Darwinism during the 20th century.
Keddy (2001) synthesize competition as a negative interaction among organisms
through the use of a same resource. For him,5
“All life forms consume resources such as water, oxygen, and nitro-
gen. This consumption reduces the supplies available for neighbors.
In order to maintain access to resources, organisms must sometimes
interfere with their neighbors. These three sentences summarize the
state of affairs [...]. Without resources, organisms will die, and so10
the contest to find, harvest, transport, store and retain possession
of resources is an essential part of the struggle for survival.”(p.1)
These words, which open Keddy’s book, are a synthesis of the resource-based
definition of competition (Fig. 1(a)).
Scientific interest for cooperation and mutual aid begin more or less at the15
same time than Darwinism with the works of Kropotkin (1902). As a naturalist,
he was among the first to argue about the potential effect of cooperation in the
evolution of natural and human systems. Nowadays, cooperation is defined as :
“a behavior which provides a benefit to another individual (recip-
ient), and which is selected because of its beneficial effect on the20
recipient” (West et al., 2007) (e.g. fig. 1(b)).
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This definition is highly compatible with works on common-pools resources
made by Ostrom (1990); Poteete et al. (2010), and research made in game
theory (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Cohen et al., 2001). It does not base the
interaction on a resource but on a behaviour. In all those works that investigate25
cooperation, the alternative to cooperation is generally considering behaviours
such as “defection” or “betrayal”. They set aside competition as it is not per se
only a behaviour.
An ontological disjunction appears when we wish to use cooperation and
competition together. For the ones working on competition what matters most30
is the interaction through or for the resources. For the others working on cooper-
ation, the behaviour is put forth. Nevertheless, behind the usual benefits/costs
matrix used in game theory, there is obviously one or several resources to con-
sider. Some previous works in ecology proposed to consider resources as media
of cooperation (Holland and DeAngelis, 2010). We follow the same line by35
considering a definition of cooperation at the same ontological level than com-
petition. For that, we propose that cooperation occurs when an agent acts upon
one or more resource(s) with a beneficial result in at least one resource for a
recipient of this action, and with a selection process for this behaviour on the
side of the acting agent (e.g. fig. 1(c)). We consider through this definition a40
large range of positive interactions. The selective aspect may be evolutionary in
natural systems, but could also be through learning or coercive forces in animal
or human societies (Hauert et al., 2007; Simon, 1990).
Setting the definition of cooperation in a resource-based context enables
transdisciplinary comparisons and cross-fertilization among scientific fields. In-45
direct effects on common resources or on a shared “enemy” (Jeffries and Lawton
(1984), enemy-free time or space act as a “resource”) are included in this def-
inition. The “multiple resources” aspect is important, particularly in complex
systems where exchanges of resources are common (carbonic compounds vs.
nutrients in plant interactions or host-symbiont interactions, survival favouring50
benefits vs. nutritional resources in animal interactions, economic capital vs.
social or cognitive capitals in human societies, etc.).
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 1: Competition is a situation when agent A acts upon a resource (R) that generate
a negative impact on a second agent B ((a) ; e.g.(Keddy, 2001)). Cooperation, as defined
by West et al. (2007), is when a behaviour of A impacts B positively and a selection process
exist on this behaviour (b). Our proposition (c) of definition of cooperation is to base the
interaction upon a resource so that it is compatible with the formalism proposed in (a). The
dashed arrows represent the selection process. The black arrows represent the interactions.
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Understanding the origins, conditions, advantages and limitations of coop-
eration in natural and social systems has motivated many investigations in the
biological and social sciences. In both animal and plant ecology the main re-55
search question is to understand the selective forces that create cooperative
situations, focusing on individuals and genes. From these considerations, a cor-
pus of complementary theories has been developed (from Hamilton (1964) to
Allen et al. (2017)) to explain the conditions to observe cooperation situations
in nature.60
On the other hand, social scientists focus on cooperative organisations and
institutions (Ostrom et al., 1994). Positive interactions are generally considered
as an intrinsic characteristic of sociability. Hence, social scientists focus on
understanding the social constructions and the mechanisms for the persistence
of cooperation among interacting entities (Rogin-Anspach, 2002).65
The two topics of “conditions” for and “mechanisms” promoting cooperation
can be explored with many approaches: the social evolution theory, ecological
approach, game theoretic approach, and social scientist approach (Bshary and
Bergmüller, 2008). However, our definition of cooperation means that the con-
ditions and mechanisms can be clearly defined in terms of resource variability70
and/or availability. It is then possible to explore the favourable environmental
conditions for cooperation to outweigh competition. It is also interesting to look
at how resource variability may promote selection at group level (West et al.,
2007).
Agent-based models and simulations can be used to introduce constraints75
in a controlled world (Veldkamp and Verburg, 2004), and assess the impacts
of different variables on the system under consideration (Delay, 2015). Some
ABM studies have already explored the effect of resource heterogeneity on coop-
eration. For example, Bousquet et al. (1998), using a game theoretic approach
explored the effect of resource spatial heterogeneity on the tragedy of the com-80
mons concept (Hardin, 1968). They showed that cooperative behaviours can
be prosperous in a population when resources are not quickly renewed, creating
heterogeneous local dynamics. The question of spatial heterogeneity and co-
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operation was further explored by Pepper and Smuts (2000). They illustrated
that the spatial heterogeneity of a resource was a possible driver favouring the85
evolution of cooperative behaviours in natural populations through a balance
among between-group and within-group selection.
In another multi-agent simulation, Smaldino et al. (2013) explored the effect
of temporally variable environments on prisoner’s dilemma types of interactions.
They showed that cooperation could be beneficial in an extremely harsh envi-90
ronment, but after a long negative impact of that environment. Their tempo-
ral variation was homogeneous through space, and the cooperate-defect games
were not directly resource-based. The same year Touza et al. (2013) used an
ABM to explore cooperation emergence in red deer (Cervus elaphus) density
management scenarios. They show that cooperation in spatial and temporal95
heterogeneous situations is highly context-dependent.
Complementing these studies, it appeared interesting for us to illustrate
how resource scarcity in space and time could provide benefits for cooperative
behaviour. Without simulating evolutionary process, we wished to explore in
which resource conditions the cooperative groups may be selected. For this, we100
considered that equity among agents was a favourable condition for the groups
through the appearance of potential feedback loop of selection at the individual
level. This egalitarian access to resources suppose that all individuals within
a cooperative group have homogeneous chances of being selected. Hence, we
tested the hypothesis that resource variability provides benefits at both the105
individual and group level to cooperative use of resource. We explored this with
an agent-based model setting cooperation among individuals depending on their
spatial location and through their use of a theoretical resource. The resource-
based approach of inter-individual interactions allows this model to go further
than a game-theory approach on the impacts of agents on the resource and on the110
dynamics of this resource. However, this model was developed for illustration
purpose (Edmonds et al., 2019) and do not claim to make any prediction on the
real world.
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2. Materials and methods
The model was motivated by reality but we chose to develop a purely abstract115
model inspired by the Epstein and Axtell (1996) “sugarscape” model. Hence,
the resource here is “sugar”, though the parallel with water management is
possible. We used the Netlogo platform (Wilensky, 1999) to implement the
model and R (Team, 2016) with RNetlogo (Thiele et al., 2012) to conduct our
experiment plan. The formalization of the model description complies with the120
ODD (overview, design concept, details) description protocol (Grimm et al.,
2006, 2010). 1.
2.1. Overview
2.1.1. Purpose
The objective was to illustrate how the spatial distribution of agents under125
spatial and temporal variability of resource accessibility affected their success in
cooperating instead of competing. We were not interested in the emergence of
cooperation and mutual aid per se. Rather, we explored in diverse socio-spatial
and temporal configurations the benefits for individual agents of being part of
a group sharing resources and the possibility for this group to create equity130
among agents.
2.1.2. Entities, state variables and scales
Entities : There were two types of entities in the model: individual agents
and patches of resources. The individuals could not choose to be part of a group.
The distance between agents defined their belonging to a group and cooperative135
behaviour. The agents were not mobile, and they could only harvest and use
resources in their direct environment.
The patches were the spatial units of our model and represented small land
portions.
1Our model development evolution and exploration scripts are available at [URL TO DOC-
UMENT AFTER ACCEPTANCE OF MANUSCRIPT]
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State variables : As in the “sugarscape” model (Epstein and Axtell, 1996)140
each patch was characterised by the sugar resource present at each time step
(pst). Additional characteristics were the maximum and minimum sugar poten-
tially available in the patch and the initial sugar value.
Each agent had its own ID, its size (S, which reflected its fitness and need
of resources), its cooperation expression (Ec), and a variable that stocked the145
available resource in the agent group accessible to all agents in that group (Sc).
Scale : The model was spatially explicit in a square space of 10000 resource
patches (100×100). The space was with periodic boundary conditions (toroidal
world). The interacting agents evolved over time with a theoretical time step
corresponding to the time necessary to use their resource and change their size.150
2.1.3. Process overview and scheduling
Our model was subdivided into four main processes (identified in detail in
the submodel section for two of them, referred to with SM numeration). They
were organized as follows for each time step:
• For patches :155
– ReSugar (SM1) regenerated the resource available in patches taking
into account the seasonality and the actual resource value.
• For agents :
– Cooperate prepared the agents that were able to cooperate to share
their resource. Each cooperative agent shared its resource stock (Sc)160
with all its cooperative neighbours so that they all had the same
amount across the group.
– Grow (SM2) defined how agents could harvest, stock and use the
resource.
• For patches:165
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– Patch-diffusion forced each cell to give an equal percentage share of
its sugar to its eight neighbours with a diffusion rate (dr) fixed for
each simulation between 0 and 0.5.
2.2. Design concepts
2.2.1. Basic Principles170
To explore the effects of spatial and temporal variability in the resource as
well as the effects of agent numbers and distributions, we compared simulations
that were modified only for the criteria: i) without allowed cooperation ii)
with allowed cooperation for some agents. With this benchmarking approach,
we had the opportunity of exploring and understanding how the spatial and175
temporal availability of resources can influence the benefits of “sharing capacity”
in theoretical groups.
2.2.2. Objective
Each agent tended to maximize its size by harvesting the resource, with
harvest size proportional to agent size. Under cooperation, the agent’s behaviour180
was modified to include sharing a fraction of the resource with its neighbouring
agents.
2.2.3. Emergence
Depending on spatial resource heterogeneity, temporal resource heterogene-
ity and agent spatial configuration, a set of situations appeared in which coop-185
eration and sharing was more efficient than being selfish in term of size incre-
mentation.
2.2.4. Observation
Simulations of 2000 steps were analysed by summarizing agent size every 10
steps (see Fig. 2). For each observation, we summarized data in three groups:190
i) for all agents (gp1), ii) only grouped agents (gp2) and iii) only lone agents
(gp3). For each of these groups we looked at the mean size of gp1, gp2 and
gp3 to obtain information about the benefits these agents derived from use of
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the resource. As an indicator of inequity between agents, we computed the
Gini index on the size distributions of gp1, gp2 and gp3. This index could take195
any value between 0, in the case of perfect equity, and 1 in the case of strong
inequity.
2.3. Details
2.3.1. Initialisation
Our agents were all initialized with the same size (S = 1) and no shared200
resource stocks (Sc = 0). As our agents were not mobile, their initial positions
were maintained within and between the simulations. These individual positions
were read from one of 90 different spatial distributions generated to represent
random, regular or clustered positions (see simulation plan sect. 2.4).
We used two types of space for the initialization of patches: i) a random205
distribution of the resource through space based on a uniform distribution and
ii) the legacy sugarscape (Epstein and Axtell, 1996) resampled with the raster
package (Hijmans, 2015). Once the patches received an initial sugar level (ops),
we defined the minimum and maximum amount of the resource for each patch.
Once patches and individuals were initialized, a “scaling distance” (Sd) was210
computed to define the cooperative agents and create groups. The scaling dis-
tance was the average of the minimum distance from the nearest neighbours
of each agent. Agents then received an Ec designation. Cooperative agents
(Ec = 1) were the agents that had a minimum distance from their nearest
neighbours that was smaller than the scaling distance. The others were not215
cooperative (Ec = 0). Hence, by construction, the nearest neighbour of a coop-
erative agent was also cooperative, and groups of mutually-cooperative agents
were formed.
At the same time, a resugar factor (Rs), later implicated in the restoration of
the resource, was computed as four times the number of agents divided by the220
number of patches. This recovering resource approach offered the opportunity of
understanding group benefit without generating an additional carrying capacity
effect other than the space map loaded during initialization.
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2.3.2. Input data
There was no external input to the system once the simulation began.225
2.3.3. Submodels
SM1 ReSugar : Resource regeneration was linked to the original space
map through the value of sugar at initialization (ops) and an additional factor
allowing for temporal heterogeneity in resource availability (Tv) creating sea-
sonal cycles of 360 ticks (when Tv = 1). The computation of the new sugar230
content of a patch (pst+1) was given by:
pst+1 = pst +Rs× ops
Mps
+ Tv × sin(p)× 40∑x=180
x=0 sin(x)
(1)
where Rs was the scaling factor set at initialisation, ops was the initialized sugar
level for this patch, Mps was the average of ops across all patches, p was a time
counter reset to zero after 360 time steps and Tv (of value 0 or 1) was used to
activate the temporal heterogeneity function. The iterative sum of sin(p) and235
the scaling parameter of 40 were used to obtain seasonal variations of resource
regeneration of +/- 20 points of sugar within half a season of 360 ticks. For
mathematical stability, the range of ps was limited to 0 and 100.
SM2 Grow : In this procedure, every agent size (Si,t for agent i at time
t) was increased or decreased following a growth rate (rSi,t) in a Verhulst-type240
equation:
Si,t+1 = Si,t + rSi,t × Si,t ×
 1−
Si,t
maxSz if rSi,t > 0
1− minSzSi,t if rSi,t ≤ 0
(2)
where maxSz and minSz are the maximum and minimum possible sizes of
the agents (arbitrarily fixed at 10 and 0.5), respectively. The growth rate rSi,t
was computed for each agent as follows (see Appendix A for visualisation):
rSi,t = maxR×
 min (1,
gSi,t
vR×((1+maxR)2−1)×Ai,t ) if gSi,t > 0
max (−1, gSi,tvR×(1−(1−maxR)2)×Ai,t ) if gSi,t ≤ 0
(3)
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where maxR was the maximum growth rate (fixed arbitrarily to 0.1 in our245
simulations), vR was the necessary resource needed by an agent of A = 1 to
keep itself at the same size (arbitrarily fixed at 2), Ai,t was the area covered by
the agent (Ai,t = pi×(Si,t2 )2), gSi,t was the available sugar (from the Np patches
under its influence (within area Ai,t) plus the shared stock Scj,t) allocated to
growth by the individual i. This gSi,t was calculated for each agent taking into250
account the local resource and, if the agent was in a group (j), the value shared
by the group (Scj,t):
gSi,t =

∑Np
k psk,t − vR×Ai,t + Scj,t × C2B if
∑Np
k psk,t < vR×Ai,t∑Np
k psk,t − vR×Ai,t + (1− Scj,t × C2S) if
∑Np
k psk,t ≥ vR×Ai,t
(4)
where Scj,t is the resource shared by the group j, C2S (Coop. to Stock)
defines the proportion of the harvested resource pooling in the group’s shared
resource, C2B (Coop. to Burn) is the proportion of the resource shared by255
the group available for each agent if its own harvested resource was not enough.
The stock reserve of the group Scj,t was depleted by each cooperative agent (i.e.
each agent with property Ec = 1) if it was using the stock for growth (Scj,t > 0
and
∑Np
k psk,t < vR × Ai,t) (the → symbol means here that the variable was
updated by each agent):260
Scj,t × (1− C2B)→ Scj,t (5)
On the other hand, if the cooperative agent did not need the stock (
∑Np
k psk,t >
vR × Ai,t), it added to it depending on the available sugar and the proportion
fixed for all the cooperative agents for a simulation (C2S) :
Scj,t + (
Np∑
k
psk,t − vR×Ai,t)× C2S → Scj,t (6)
Scj,t was bound to a maximum value arbitrarily fixed at 10 000 for mathematical
stability. The non-cooperative agents (Ec = 0) did not use or update Sc. In265
this case gSi,t was then fixed at
∑Np
k psk,t−vR×Ai,t. All of this mathematical
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construction ensured that agents grew and decreased their size depending on the
available resource, their size and the reserve of the group for cooperative agents.
C2S and C2B parameters represent the ability of cooperators to stock part of
their harvest and use a stocked part of their harvest in the event of spatial270
and temporal scarcity. These parameters were considered as social cooperation
rules. The resource content of the Np patches affected by the growth of an agent
were updated considering the agent’s harvest. For a given patch u affected by
an agent a and before being affected by an agent b:
psu,t,a −
∑Np
k psk,t
Np
→ psu,t,b (7)
The random order of updating agents for each time step cancelled out the in-275
equality in front of the use of shared patches.
The main global parameters of the model are listed in the Appendix B.
2.4. Simulation plan
As explained in the initialization section of the ODD, the spatial distribution
of individuals and resource were factors that we explored to evaluate the benefits280
of cooperation in different resource availability and distribution scenarios. The
other factors to explore were the resource diffusion rate (dr), the fact that
resource replenishment varied over time (Tv) and cooperative behaviours (C2S
and C2B).
Before looking at the cooperation situations, we ran each simulation without285
cooperation (Ec = 0 for all agents) in order to compare the situations with and
without cooperation. For these simulations, 3 spatial distributions of agents
(random, regular, clustered), 3 agent numbers (100, 506, 992) and 10 random
replicates of each combination (distribution and number) were generated with
R (Team, 2016) and the spatstat package (Baddeley et al., 2015) (see Appendix290
C). With these 90 fixed spatial configurations of agents, 2 resource distribution
types (homogeneous or clustered), the 2 resource replenishment types (Tv = 0
or 1) and 6 diffusion rates values (dr = 0, 0.1, 0.2...0.5), the total number of
runs was 2160 for situations without cooperation. For each run we recorded the
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Figure 2: Explanation of the three indicators used to summarize the outcomes of simulations:
∆S, DS and ∆G. The dashed lines indicate the attributes of agents (S = size). The G
measures the Gini index of sizes within a group of agents. The continuous lines indicate
computations of difference. The curly braces indicate computations of average.
mean agent size and Gini index of size distribution in the three agent groups295
gp1, gp2 and gp3 (see section 2.2.4) during the second half of the simulation
(from step 1001 to 2000).
The simulations with cooperation replicated the same situations but also allowed
C2S and C2B to vary. Both parameters were fixed at 0.1, 0.5 or 0.9. For the
resulting 19440 simulations with cooperation, the same indicators (mean agent300
size and Gini index for each of the three groups) were recorded. To summarize
the effect of cooperation from all these simulations we focused on three indicators
(Fig. 2).
The first one, ∆S, was an indicator of gain in size for the gp2 individuals
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with cooperative behaviour allowed. ∆S was computed as a difference among305
simulations without cooperation and with cooperation behaviour allowed for
identical parametrisation. At each observation time (100 measurements in the
second half of the simulations), for each individual of gp2 the difference in
size with and without cooperation was computed. Then, the mean of these
differences was computed per observation time. Finally, ∆S was the mean over310
time of these mean differences. This indicator was positive when cooperation
made agents larger than when cooperation was not included and negative when
agents lost size with the inclusion of cooperation.
The second indicator, DS, was a measure of the advantage in cooperating
obtained by comparing the size of gp2 agents (cooperative individuals) and315
gp3 agents (non-cooperative individuals). It was computed as the mean over
time of the difference between the mean sizes of cooperative individuals and
the mean sizes of non-cooperative individuals. This indicator was positive when
cooperative individuals were larger on average than non-cooperative agents.
The third indicator, ∆G, was a measure of the changes in the inequalities320
(size differences) between cooperative agents (gp2). ∆G was computed as the
mean over time of the difference between the Gini index of a simulation with
cooperation allowed and the Gini index of the corresponding simulation without
cooperation. Negative values indicated that inequality increased with cooper-
ation being allowed in the simulations. Positive values indicated a more equal325
distribution of sizes with cooperation than without.
To summarize all of these results and focus on which conditions made coop-
eration individually advantageous thus leading to better sharing of the resource,
we extracted the simulations in which the three indicators ∆S, DS and ∆G were
above 0 in at least 75% of the simulations in a given parametrisation. The choice330
to use ∆G as one of these indicators implies that cooperation needed to increase
equity among cooperative agents to be considered beneficial. This egalitarian
access to resources meant that all individuals within a cooperative group had
an equal chance of being selected. This choice was made also to avoid the case
where an average increase in the size of cooperative agents (shown by a positive335
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∆S) is not due to benefits accruing only to one or a few individuals, which could
then be seen more as a parasitic situation than as cooperation.
3. Results
In this section, we present some simulation results for the three different
indicators regarding three different points of view. We finish this section with340
a summary of the conditions propitious to cooperative behaviour.
3.1. Cooperation vs. individualism depending on agent wealth
Focusing on the simulations with 506 randomly distributed agents and the
∆S indicator, we were able to look at the effect of the C2S and C2B parameters
on the difference in success of gaining size for identical individuals between345
conditions where cooperation was allowed or not allowed. These differences in
size were positive when cooperation was individually beneficial for the agents
involved in cooperation. For each cooperation setting (combination of C2S and
C2B) and spatio-temporal variation in the resource, we were able to identify a
maximum gain in size of the cooperative agents with an optimal spatial diffusion350
of the resource (dr, Fig. 3).
Without temporal resource variation (Fig. 3 a-b), the gain in size for co-
operators increased under intermediate values of tested resource diffusion (dr).
With clustered spatial distribution of the resource (Fig. 3b) the gain in size
increase for high C2S and low C2B. This latter result highlights the effect of355
spatial distribution of the resource on the agent’s potential gain from cooper-
ation. There was a combined effect of resource distribution and cooperation
rules on optimum access to the resource. For example, with cooperation rules
of C2S of 0.5 and C2B of 0.5, an optimum appeared at a spatial dr of 0.2 (Fig.
3a). This optimum shifted to a dr of 0.1 with a clustered spatial distribution of360
resources (Fig. 3b). But a C2S of 0.9 and C2B of 0.9 shifted the optimum dr
back to 0.2 (Fig. 3b).
Temporal heterogeneity (Fig. 3c-d) clearly favoured the gain in size of co-
operative agents and increased the variability of that gain depending on the
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resource access parametrisation (comparing Fig. 3c to 3a). The gain in size365
reached more than 0.1 for a dr of 0.2, a C2S of 0.9 and a C2B of 0.1 (Fig.
3c). The introduction of resource spatial clustering (Fig. 3d) led to even higher
size gain for the same configuration of dr, C2S and C2B. High C2S and low
C2B mean a fairly stable shared stock, allowing more temporal averaging of
the cooperative use of the resource and hence high values of ∆S in the face370
of temporal scarcity. Different C2S and C2B parameters (e.g. C2S = 0.1 and
C2B = 0.5) might however lead to very low gains in size.
The effects of spatial and temporal variability of resources in interaction with
specific values of C2S and C2B illustrates how the “social” rules of cooperation
can be used to compensate for the geographical determinism of resource avail-375
ability and its spatial variability. The dr, C2S and C2B parameters correspond
to different spatial and temporal averaging settings. The cooperation rules pro-
vide an averaging among cooperative agents but generate costs at the individual
level. Increasing the resource diffusion (dr) increase the averaging of resource
for all and at no explicit cost (see Appendix D for an illustration of the effect380
through time of dr). Hence, cooperation is most beneficial when averaging is
necessary in the face of temporal or spatial scarcity and not provided already
by a diffusion process. In other words, when the diffusion process is low and
resources are clustered in space or time, the extra costs of cooperation is worth
to let circulate faster this resource among cooperative agents, who then gain in385
size. In such cases, the high C2S and low C2B are the most successful.
3.2. Cooperative vs. non-cooperative behaviour in a cooperative world
The initial population size and spatial arrangement of agents had an ef-
fect on the difference in size between cooperative agents and non-cooperative
agents in simulations with cooperation allowed. To illustrate this, we looked390
at constant social rules of cooperation C2S and C2B (both fixed at 0.5 in Fig.
4). In a random resource map without temporal resource variation (Fig. 4a),
a regular agent distribution led to an almost identical size of cooperative and
non-cooperative agents while clustered or random distribution of agents led to
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Figure 3: Effects of spatial and temporal resource variability, cooperation behaviour (C2S
(Coop. to Stock) and C2B (Coop. to Burn)) and resource diffusion rate (the grey colours
in each group of 6 successive box-plots within each colour column represent a variation in dr
from 0 (black/left) to 0.5 (whitish/right)) on the difference in mean size of the cooperative
agents among the non-cooperation-allowed and the cooperation-allowed simulations (∆S) for
a selected condition of spatial distribution and number of agents (506 individuals with random
distribution). Positive values indicate that cooperation promoted an increase in size of the
cooperative individuals. The top row (a,b) shows simulation results without temporal resource
variability, while the bottom row (c,d) had temporal resource variability. The left columns
(a,c) are with a randomized spatial resource while the right columns (b,d) are with two clusters
of the resource (“sugarmap”).
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a larger size of non-cooperative agents than cooperative agents (negative DS).395
In the other cases of spatial and/or temporal variability of the resource (Fig. 4
b,c,d) the DS was always larger for regularly distributed agents than clustered
or randomly distributed agents. Without temporal variation but with spatial
heterogeneity of the resource (Fig. 4b), a regular distribution of 506 or 992
agents led cooperative agents to have larger sizes than non-cooperative agents400
(DS > 0). In these cases, an optimum dr value appeared at 0.1. With tem-
poral resource variation (Fig. 4 c-d), a small number of randomly distributed
populations of agents had an advantage in cooperating with a dr of 0.2. With
100 agents, the maximum DS at dr of 0.2 was true for all resource distribu-
tions. However, the regular distribution of agents still enhanced the advantage405
of cooperative agents (DS > 0).
In term of mechanisms behind these results, the regular distribution of agents
allowed optimal sharing of resources in cooperative groups of small size. Indeed,
the regular distribution created smaller groups than the two other distribution
types (see Appendix E). When comparing the success of growth of cooperative410
agents to non-cooperative ones, small cooperative groups could do overall better
than large groups. Large cooperative groups created some spatial configuration
with individuals in the centre of many other, and hence not accessing resources.
The intermediate dr values effect was a bit similar: the resource accessibility
needed to be high enough but not too high so that all agents could benefits from415
the resources coming from empty areas.
3.3. Inequality in the cooperation kingdom
Positive changes in the Gini index brought about by cooperation (∆G, Fig.
5) indicated a more equal distribution of sizes with cooperation than without,
among the cooperative agents (and only these agents, see Fig. 2).420
Without temporal or spatial resource variation (Fig. 5 a), the variations of
∆G were highly influenced by the dr and spatial distribution of agents. In the
cases of random and clustered distribution of agents, cooperation generated a
decrease in size equity among cooperative agents for small values of resource
19
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
100 506 992 100 506 992 100 506 992
Random Clustered Regular
a)DS
N.Spatial
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
100 506 992 100 506 992 100 506 992
Random Clustered Regular
b)DS
N.Spatial
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
100 506 992 100 506 992 100 506 992
Random Clustered Regular
c)DS
N.Spatial
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
100 506 992 100 506 992 100 506 992
Random Clustered Regular
d)DS
N.Spatial
{Ag.{Ag.
{Ag. {Ag.
Figure 4: Effects of spatial and temporal resource variability, spatial distribution and number
of agents and resource diffusion rate (identical to figure 3) on the difference in mean size
between the cooperative agents and the non-cooperative agents (DS) for a selected condition
of cooperation behaviour (C2S = 0.5, C2B = 0.5). Positive values indicate that cooperative
individuals were larger overall than non-cooperative agents. Graph layout (a-d) is identical
to figure 3.
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diffusion (when dr ≤ 0.2, ∆G < 0). This decrease was less visible with only425
100 agents. However, high diffusion rates (dr > 0.3) led to a small advantage
for cooperation in terms of size equity. For these spatial configuration (random
and clustered agents) a low resource diffusion dr made that resources were more
accessible to border agents of cooperative groups. When dr increases, this ad-
vantage disappeared and the groups received more resources, hence the equity430
increased within the cooperative groups. The regular distribution of few agents
(100 or 506) also homogenized the access to resources. With 992 regularly dis-
tributed agents, the effect of dr was visible again.
The clustered spatial distribution of the resource (Fig. 5 b) had a decreasing
effect on the dispersion of ∆G but also decreased the number of cases with435
positive ∆G. Clustered resources were not conducive to equity among agents
in general, but cooperation increased these inequities in this case (Fig. 5b).
Here, the decrease in ∆G was due to a difference of resource access among
cooperative agents. The cooperative agents on top of the high resource areas
had more resources to share, grow and hence access new resources than the440
agents in lower resource areas. This created inequity among all the cooperative
agents (between groups).
With temporal resource variation, the optimum resource diffusion to obtain
a reduction in inequity in the simulations seemed to decrease (comparing Fig.
5 a and c). This was particularly true with 100 individuals. However with 906445
individuals, whatever their spatial distribution, inequity was increased with co-
operation (Fig. 5c). Adding spatially explicit resource distribution to temporal
resource variation did not modify these patterns (Fig. 5d). However, as without
temporal variation, a clustered resource was not an opportunity for agents to
decrease inequity with cooperation.450
We saw previously that cooperation promoted a larger size of cooperators
with heterogeneous resource distribution than with homogeneous distribution
(Fig. 3 & 4). We see now that these large sizes were built on greater inequity
between agents.
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Figure 5: Effects of spatial and temporal resource variability, spatial distribution and number
of agents and resource diffusion (identical to figure 3) on the difference in the mean Gini
index among the non-cooperation-allowed and the cooperation-allowed simulations (∆G) for
a selected condition of cooperation behaviour (C2S = 0.5, C2B = 0.5). ∆G is computed as the
difference of Gini index of sizes of the cooperative agents (only, see Fig. 2). Positive values
indicate a more equal distribution of sizes with cooperation than without for the selected
agents (that are cooperating when cooperation is allowed). Negative values indicate that
inequality increased with cooperation being allowed in the simulations.
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3.4. When does it pay to cooperate?455
In the results presented above, the simulations were with the same configu-
ration for C2S (0.5) and C2B (0.5). It cannot therefore be seen whether agents
could use the lever of cooperation rules to reduce inequity. We were interested
in finding situations where cooperation was the best solution for agents in terms
of a gain in size (∆S), a larger size for cooperators than non-cooperative agents460
(DS) and reduced inequity (∆G). Blank squares in Fig. 6 imply that no con-
figuration with these parametrisations led simultaneously to a larger size with
cooperation than without, a larger size of cooperative individuals than non-
cooperative individuals and lower inequality among the cooperative individuals
when cooperation was allowed. On the contrary, the grey squares indicate a465
favourable situation for cooperation. For each grey square, Fig. 6 indicates
the resource diffusion rate (dr) value(s) that comply with the rule of 75% of
simulation results conducive to cooperation for the three indicators.
We can see a clear opposition between simulation without temporal vari-
ability (Fig. 6 a-b) and simulation with temporal variability (Fig. 6 c-d) as470
noted in section 3.1. In the first case, no parametrisations appeared beneficial
for cooperation. The second case with temporal variability clearly introduced
some positive configurations. However, they were restricted to small numbers
of agents (100 or 506) and a regularly spaced distribution of them. In the case
with spatial clustering of the resource (Fig. 6d), this was even more strictly475
confined to the simulations with 100 agents. The regular spatial distribution
of agents favours cooperation through two mechanisms: a decrease of spatial
competition for resource and the creation of small groups with few connections.
These enhance the equity among cooperative agents and hence come out as a
major factor in Fig. 6. Lastly, an effect of cooperation rules was also visible.480
Some cases of C2S and C2B did not favour cooperation while others did. More
specifically, in the case of a spatially and temporally heterogeneous resource
(Fig. 6d), it was good to stock the shared resource a lot (high C2S) and use it
moderately (low C2B) in order to have beneficial cooperation for a large number
of agents.485
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Figure 6: Effects of spatial and temporal resource variability, spatial distribution and number
of agents (N. and Spatial) and cooperation behaviour (C2S and C2B) on a summary test
showing the resource diffusion rate (dr) when all three indicators (∆S, DS and ∆G) showed
a 1st quartile distribution above 0. Blank squares imply that no configuration with this
parametrisation led simultaneously to a larger size with cooperation than without, a larger
size of cooperative individuals than non-cooperative individuals and lower inequality among
the cooperative individuals. The top row (a,b) shows simulation results without temporal
resource variability, while the bottom row (c,d) had temporal resource variability. The left-
hand columns (a,c) are with a randomized spatial resource while the right-hand columns (b,d)
are with two resource clusters (“sugarmap”).
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4. Discussion
In this paper our objective was double : i) support an ontological approach of
cooperation compatible with actual consideration on competition, ii) illustrate
with a model that there may be some conditions when cooperative agents are
successful compared to competitive agents. In accordance with previous works490
(Touza et al., 2013; Pepper and Smuts, 2000; Boza and Scheuring, 2004), our
simulations showed that heterogeneity of spatial resources is necessary for the
success of cooperation at the group level. We included equity (∆G) as part of the
success of cooperation at the group level to consider potential natural selection
on all agents of cooperative groups. In this context, we illustrated that in some495
settings, temporal scarcity of the resource can have a greater influence over
cooperation success than the spatial variability of the resource.
We observed that spatial averaging of resources can be interesting for co-
operative agents in the face of scarcity when the diffusion of these resources is
not too high. In addition, our model made possible to explore the influence500
of another dimension in resource heterogeneity: the variability in agent access,
especially through their spatial configuration. We observed that the factors
favouring equity in access to the resource was conducive to the success of co-
operation. So our results illustrate “when does resource scarcity favour group
cooperation”.505
4.1. Configuration of the interactions’ topology matters
In a heterogeneous temporal resource context, we found that the regular
agent layout concentrated all favourable conditions for cooperation especially
for 100 and 506 agents. These results can be interpreted in the light of the
rule of Ohtsuki et al. (2006) of a necessary benefit-to-cost ratio above the mean510
number of interacting neighbours in a network reciprocity configuration. In-
deed, our regular spatial configuration of a few agents created a regular lattice
in terms of the topological network of interaction. The mean number of inter-
acting neighbours was thus relatively small and the benefits did not need to be
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as high as in a clustered spatial configuration of agents for cooperation to be515
more beneficial than individualistic behaviour. Recent work on the topologi-
cal structure of populations implies that clustered situations could even be, in
themselves, never conducive to cooperation (Allen et al., 2017).
We cannot say whether a regular layout is an initial need for cooperation
or whether it is the emergent result of local competition like proposed by the520
“Central place theory” (Christaller, 1933) or the self-thinning rule in ecology
(Yoda, 1963; Stoll and Bergius, 2005), but in any event the link between regular
spacing and the benefits of cooperation is strengthened by our results. It is
thus possible to put forward the hypothesis that it is only when competition
is reduced with regular and egalitarian access to the resource that cooperation525
can be beneficial to all. It would be interesting to investigate empirically the
other outputs of the model concerning group size in cooperation. The fact that
cooperation is favoured in and beneficial for groups of small numbers of agents
should be considered in political policy and particularly in the case of stake-
holder empowerment. On the contrary, the current trend in collective irrigation530
management is to merge small groups to achieve an economy of scale (Delay
and Linton, 2019; Campardon et al., 2012). This opposite trend can become
critical for maintaining cooperation in large management groups (Axelrod and
Keohane, 1985; Allen et al., 2017; Reia and Fontanari, 2017).
Empirical observations by Hamburger et al. (1975) or Smaldino and Lubell535
(2011) illustrated the role of group size in cooperation. Barnes et al. (2017)
questioned cooperation in harvesting common-pool fishery resources consider-
ing the fact that fishing is a highly competitive economic activity, in which
uncertainty linked to spatial and temporal heterogeneity of the resource is high.
In the same way as Ohtsuki et al. (2006), Barnes et al. (2017) used the costs540
and benefits approach based on resource management. They highlighted in this
context some sociological conditions conducive to cooperative behaviour. These
interesting observations confirm the theoretical work of Allen et al. (2017) about
the limitations of network size and topology on cooperation and illustrate them
in the context of a common-pool management system. Our results regarding545
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the number of agents and resource accessibility corroborate these findings. The
largest numbers of agents never succeed to obtain cooperation entirely beneficial
to cooperative groups in our simulations.
4.2. Temporal scarcity as engine of cooperation
In our model, the sharing capacity of cooperative groups created a temporal550
buffer for the agents to deal with lack of resources. This explains the important
role of temporal scarcity of the resource in favouring cooperation and creat-
ing equity within cooperative groups. The temporal variability of the resource
necessary for cooperation to be beneficial can also be understood through the
benefit-to-cost ratio rule of Ohtsuki et al. (2006) in network reciprocity. In our555
model, as in many real systems, the costs of setting aside part of the potential
resource for harder days to come are temporally immediate. On the other hand,
the benefits are temporally worthwhile only if these resources do indeed become
scarce at some time. Hence, the benefit-to-cost ratio can favour cooperation at
the group level only if those resources are temporally variable. Specific network560
configurations are necessary for individual benefits of cooperation Allen et al.
(2017). But we show that at the group level, the temporal effects of resource
availability are important drivers of cooperation, particularly considering the
criteria of reducing inequity among cooperative agents (∆G).
This surprising link between temporal heterogeneity and collective manage-565
ment opens up various avenues of investigation. Indeed, as Springer (2016, 8)
says "[...] any given commons is a geographical matifestation of mutual aid".
Among other things, the possibility of characterizing potential for the emer-
gence of cooperation through some indicators of spatial-temporal variability of
resources is an interesting research objective. The theoretical work initiated by570
Ohtsuki et al. (2006) or Allen et al. (2017) towards characterizing interactions
and network configurations lacks the temporal aspects of the resource.
4.3. About our positioning
Among our modelling hypotheses, the nearest neighbour distance used to
impose cooperative behaviour between agents (sect. Design concepts 2.2) is575
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a highly structuring hypothesis. This choice corresponds to general beliefs in
different research fields. In geography, socio-economics or ecology, cooperation
is strongly tied to the spatial proximity of agents (Tobler, 1970). It would be
interesting in future work to analyse the effect of a different topology of social
networks on the benefits of sharing resources.580
Another modelling assumption to explore further is the choice of using one
kind and one use of resource. Obviously, real resources and access to them can
be complementary between agents, plural and temporally variable (Torre and
Wallet, 2014). Our resource-based assumption of relationships among agents
was influenced by Epstein and Axtell (1996) and their artificial society where585
agents eat and metabolize a renewable resource. Our agents’ optimum behaviour
was resource-oriented. This modelling choice was justified by the simple repre-
sentation of agent interactions.
Our objective was to illustrate in which cases cooperation was successful
compared to competition in some spatial and temporal environments. For a590
given model or system, once the settings favouring cooperation are identified,
it could be possible to explore in these domains and margins if cooperation
can emerge in the face of competition. Working on resource-based defini-
tions, one could balance the debate between competition and cooperation in
the same terms. This ontological equilibrium between cooperation and com-595
petition, without having to rely on “games theory” and “prisoner’s dilemma”
approaches (Waldeck, 2013; Ohdaira and Takao, 2009; Cohen et al., 2001; Axel-
rod and Hamilton, 1981) can be seen as the settings for fertile interdisciplinary
approaches. Indeed, ecologists as well as social scientists can use our framework
to filter their own reality (Varenne, 2017). Hence, this work can be seen as an600
extension of Epstein and Axtell (1996) focusing on cooperation rather than mar-
kets and trade. Models developed considering the resource-based definition of
cooperation could also serve to explore spatial pattern formation (Rietkerk and
van de Koppel, 2008) in the conditions where cooperation increase the speed of
resource exchange among agents compared to the diffusion process (see e.g. for605
review Kondo and Miura, 2010).
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Our model highlights that there are, in general, few circumstances in which
cooperation is beneficial. It is worth noting that we gave importance to eq-
uity between individuals in our interpretation of beneficial cooperation (through
∆G). In human cooperation, such equity is not always a reality. Indeed, in dif-610
ferent cooperative institutions, the equity between individuals is not the objec-
tive of the cooperation. The objective is more often a mutual benefit increasing
the fitness of each cooperator (Delay, 2015; Gide and Tenin, 2014).
To conclude, our model illustrates that the link between temporal and spatial
uncertainty can be understood as a driver leading to the creation of a cooperative615
group. However, our results do not claim to illustrate how an environmental
resource should be sustainably managed, and further studies should explore the
emergence of cooperative institutions that manage resources.
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Appendix A. Visualisation of Submodels810
The figure A.1 presents the illustration of the result of equation 3 with
different values of gS and depending on the size of the agent (S).
Appendix B. Parameters
We present here the table of the global parameters used in the model.
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Figure A.1: Illustration of the mathematical function giving growth rate value (rS) depending
on agent size (S) and available sugar (gS, or missing sugar when gS < 0).
Appendix C. Initialisation of spatial distribution of agents815
The positions of agents was always at the centre of a patch. The random
distributions of agents was obtained with a Poisson process of complete spatial
randomness.
For the creation of 10 different clustered spatial distributions of n agents,
we used a Matern Cluster Process of intensity of n10 , a radius parameter of the820
clusters of 0.2 and a number of points per cluster of 10. We kept only simulations
of these processes that gave the expected number of agent (n = 100, 506 or 992).
For the creation of the regular spacing distributions, we started with an
implementation of a hexagonal close packing of the requested n agents. To
obtain the 10 different distributions and have agents that could have a minimum825
neighbour distance below a mean value, we inserted noise around these regular
positions. Each agent was then "moved" with a random value of ±0.5.
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Parameter name Description Values
dr Diffusion rate of the resource 0, 0.1, ..., 0.5
Ec
Binary parameter to allow or
not the sharing of resources
0 or 1
Tv
Binary parameter to allow or
not the seasonal variation of
resource replenishment
0 or 1
C2B
Proportion of the shared resource
used by an agent when in cooperation
0.1, 0.5 or 0.9
C2S
Proportion of available resource
allocated by an agent to the shared resource
0.1, 0.5 or 0.9
maxSz Maximum size of agents 10
minSz Minimum size of agents 0.5
maxR Maximum growth rate of agents 0.1
vR
Necessary resource needed
for maximum growth
2
Appendix D. Resource visualisation
We present here (Fig. D.2) some examples of resource spatial distribution
in different scenarios of diffusion (dr) and with either an initialisation with830
randomized spatial resource or two resource clusters (“sugarmap”). The spatial
distribution of resource is dependant on initialized settings, growth of the agents
and diffusion rate. The higher the diffusion rate, the more homogenized the
resource.
Appendix E. Network analysis of spatial distributions of agents835
We present here (Fig. E.3) some mean characteristics of the cooperative
networks (groups of cooperative agents) created in the initialization setting with
random, regular or clustered spatial distributions of all agents.
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Figure D.2: Evolution of the spatial resource distribution in different scenarios (a): initialized
conditions with randomized spatial resource; (b): simulation with dr = 0.1 at t = 1100; (c):
simulation with dr = 0.5 at t = 1100; (d): initialized conditions with two resource clusters
(“sugarmap”); (e): simulation with dr = 0.1 at t = 1100; (f): simulation with dr = 0.5 at
t = 1100. The red agents are the cooperative agents whereas violet ones do not share resources.
All simulations with Tv = 1, C2B = C2S = 0.5 and 992 randomly distributed agents.
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Figure E.3: Mean number of connections, mean number of agents in the networks and mean
number of networks of cooperative agents created with the different settings of number and
spatial distribution of agents.
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